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Abstract
This paper investigates whether or not bankruptcy proceedings 
should be initiated by an investor (or a group of investors) 
owning positive proportions of each type of security issued by the 
firm. We show that under certainty such an investor, called here a 
mixed creditor/shareholder, always has a strong incentive for 
value-maximization, while other investors may only have a weak 
incentive. We also shew that under uncertainty, a mixed 
creditor/shareholder has less incentive to make decisions that 
benefit one class of investors at the expense of another. And when 
he holds equal percentages of debt and equity he always has a 
strong incentive to make exactly the right decision.
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While the impact of bankruptcy costs1 on the value of the
2firm has been examined in several different ways, no one has yet
3examined it from the standpoint of a mixed creditor/shareholder. 
The reason may be institutional: legal restrictions in some
countries do not allow the groups of debt holders and equity 
holders to overlap. For example, the Glass-Steagall Act in the 
United States prohibits any equity ownership by banks, while 
Japanese banks normally own stock in their client firms up to the
4ceiling limit of 5 percent imposed by the Anti-Monopoly Act. 
Whatever the reason, when there are several parties affected by a 
decision like whether to liquidate, a question arises, who should 
make the decision?
1. As White (1983) points out, bankruptcy costs can be divided 
into two categories. First, ex post or direct bankruptcy costs 
incurred after the firm's bankruptcy filing, such as the 
administrative expenses. Second, ex ante or indirect bankruptcy 
costs incurred before the actual filing, such as those resulting 
from investors' attempts to reduce their losses if bankruptcy 
occurs and/or of bankruptcy induced distortions in investment 
incentives. In this paper we focus on the second category.
2. See Bulow and Shoven (1978), Haugen and Senbet (1978), 
Hellwig (1981), Higgins and Schall (1975), Stiglitz (1972), 
Titman (1984), Van Horne (1976), Webb (1990), and White (1989), 
among others.
3. What we mean here by a mixed creditor/shareholder is an agent 
owning positive shares of the total amount of each security 
issued by the firm.
4. Note however the use by some U.S. firms of "strip financing" 
in which each participant in a reorganization purchases an 
identical set of (inseparable) claims against the firm, ranging 
from secured debt to senior unsecured debt to junior unsecured 




























































































The purpose of this paper is to determine whether or not 
bankruptcy proceedings should be initiated by a mixed 
creditor/shareholder rather than by creditors on their own (as is 
the usal practice). For that purpose we compare, in a simple 
model, the private incentives of three parties, the bondholders, 
the equity holders, and a mixed creditor/shareholder, to liquidate 
or continue an already failing firm, using the firm's value 
maximization criteria. Both certainty and uncertainty situations 
are considered.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in 
section 2. Sections 3 and 4 determine how efficient the private 
incentives of the claimants of all three types are in certainty 
and uncertainty situations, respectively. Section 5 is the 
conclusion.
2. The basic model
We employ a three-date model in which the firm chooses its 
security structure and undertakes some investments at time 0. For 
simplicity, we assume that the firm issues only two types of 
securities, bonds and shares, and that the former are described by 
the obligation to pay D at time 1.
Let Y denote the liquid assets or cash available at time 1. We 
assume that Y < D, so the firm is insolvent in a cash flow sense 
and faces a nontrivial bankruptcy decision. Let d indicate the 




























































































liquidate (d = 1) or continue (d = c) its current operations. We 
assume also that security holders of all three types choose among 
the two alternatives according to which one maximizes the expected 
returns of their claims. Finally, we assume that all cash flows 
from both liquidation and continuation accrue at time 2, and that 
the firm makes no interim cash payments until time 2.
Let V(d) denote the total cash distribution to all security 
holders when decision d is taken. Ordinarily, debt has priority 
over equity. Then, in the absense of discounting, the returns on 
bonds and shares which are associated with decision d are B(d) =
min{v(d), D} and S(d ) = max{ V(d) - D, 0}, respectively.
3. Strong VS- weak incentives
Definitions : An agent has a strong incentive for value
maximization if and only if he is better off with the right
decision.
An agent has a weak incentive for value maximization if and 
only if he is as well off with the right decision.
Assume here that V(d) is non-stochastic for all d. Then, we 
have the following propositions.
Proposition 1; Both bondholders and equity holders always have at 




























































































strong incentive for value maximization if and only if Vfd^) > 
V(d2) and D > V(d2); and equity holders have a strong incentive 
for value maximization if and only if Vfd.̂ ) > V(d2) and Vfd^) > D.
Proof: The forms of the functions B(d) and S(d) imply that 
Vfd^ > V(d2) => B(d1) > B(d2) and Sfd^ > S(d2),
so there is at least a weak incentive. On the other hand,
B (d̂ )̂ > B(d2) <=> min{V(d1), D} > min{V(d2), D}
<=> V(dL) > min{V(d2), d } and D > min{V(d2), d }
<=> D > V(d2) and Vfd^) > V(d2), and
S(d ) > S(d2) <=> maxfVfd.^) - D, 0} > max{V(d2) - D, 0}
<=> maxfvcd^) - D, 0} > V(d2) - D and maxlvfd^) - D, 0} > 0
<=> V(d-ĵ ) - D > 0 and V(d1) - D > V(d2) - D
<=> V(d1) > 0 and V(dx) > V{d2).
Proposition 2: A mixed creditor/shareholder always has a strong
incentive for value maximization.
Proof: The mixed creditor/shareholder maximizes
R(d) = a min{V(d), D} + B max{v(d) - D, 0} 
with respect to decision d, where a and B denote the positive 





























































































aV(d) (if V(d) < D)
R(d)
aV(d) + B[V(d) - D] = gV(d) + (a - B)D (if V(d) > D)
which is always increasing in V.
The situation is shown in Figure 1 for the case when V(l) = D 
and V(c) varies.
Figure 1: Weak vs. strong incentives
If V(c) < V(l) = D, bondholders have a strong incentive to 




























































































B(c) = V(c); shareholders have a weak incentive to choose 
liquidation since S(1) = S(c) = 0; and a mixed 
creditor/shareholder has strong incentive to choose liquidation 
since aB{l) + BS(1) = aD > aB(c) + 8S(c) = aV(c).
On the other hand, if V(c) > V(l) = D, shareholders have a 
strong incentive to choose the right decision -i.e., continuation- 
since S(c) = V(c) - D > S(1) = 0; bondholders have a weak 
incentive to choose continuation since 3(1) = B(c) = D; and a 
mixed creditor/shareholder has a strong incentive to choose 
continuation since aB(c) + BS(c) = aD + B[V(c) d } > aB(l) + 
BS(1) = aD.
4. The liquidation policy with uncertainty
Assume here that V(c) is now stochastic, but V(l) is still 
non-stochastic. Assume further that security holders of all three 
types are risk neutral and share at time 1 a common probability 
distribution about the firm's return from continuation. It is
assumed that if the firm continues operating, then the total cash 
distribution to all security holders will be either V^tc) or
V2(c) , with probabilities of p, and p2, respectively, where >
0, p2 > 0, and p1 + p2 = 1. We define V(c) = p̂ V-̂ fc) + p2V2(c) as
the expected value of the ongoing firm. It is also assumed that if 
the firm continues operating, then the claim D will be paid in 




























































































distribution to all security holders from continuation will always 
be positive. These assumptions can be summarized as follows: Vn(c)
> D > V2(c) > 0.
Given the above definition and assumptions, we have the 
following propositions.
Proposition 3: There may no longer be even a weak incentive for
either bond or shareholders to maximize the firm's expected value. 
Proof: For simplicity, assume that the firm is insolvent in a 
bankruptcy sense. That is, whether the firm liquidates or 
continues, V(d) < D.
Assume first that D > V (1) > V(c). The expected returns on 
shares which are associated with liquidation and continuation are 
S(1) = 0 and S(c) = p lV ^ c ) - D] > 0. Thus, S(l) < S(c) , and so
shareholders will prefer continuation to liquidation, although 
from an economic viewpoint the firm should be liquidated because 
V(l) > V(c).
In addition, shareholders may prefer to conduct a riskier, 
inefficient continuation activity if p1[V1(c) - D] is increased
since they recive all the remaining cash after debt holders are 
paid in state 1, and risk nothing in state 2 in which bondholders 
bear all the risk.
Assume now that D > V(c) > V(l). The expected returns on bonds 




























































































V(1) and B(c) = p1D + p2V2(c). IE V2(c) is less than V(l), then
B(c) can easily be smaller than B{1) - indeed, it will be if 
P2[V(1) - V2(c)1 > Pl[D - V(1)].
When B (c) < B(l), then bondholders will prefer liquidation to 
continuation, although from an economic viewpoint the firm should 
continue because V(c) > V(l).
In addition, bondholders may prefer to conduct a safer, 
inefficient continuation activity if p^D + p2V2(c) is increased
since they recover D in state 1, and bear the entire risk in state
2.
Security holders have an economically inefficient incentive if 
they stand to gain incrementally from the wrong decision. However, 
if the total cash distribution to ail security holders remains 
constant and positive, such a gain will have to be at the expense 
to other security holders. So, the perverse decision incentives 
arise because the wrong decision may engender wealth transfers 
between debt holders and equity holders. On the other hand,
Proposition 4: A mixed creditor/shareholder who owns equal 
positive proportions of both debt and equity has a strong 
incentive to maximize the firm's expected value.
Proof: If a = B =6, the mixed creditor/shareholder will 
maximize E 9 [B (d ) + S(d)] = E 0 V(d) = 9 V(d) with respect to 




























































































In addition, since he receives a fraction of the upside cash 
in state 1, and bears a fraction of the risk in state 2, a mixed 
creditor/shareholder may be more of a risk-taker than debt holders 
and less of a risk-taker than equity holders, thus reducing the 
tension between debt and equity regarding the attitudes to risk.
5. Conclusion
The central problem when either debt holders or equity holders 
exercise complete control is that they each act solely in their 
own interests. The actions of these classes of investors are 
therefore not based on maximizing the total value of the firm and 
may be taken at the expense of other classes.
The main result of the paper is that the waste from non­
maximizing decisions is reduced and may be even eliminated if a 
mixed creditor/shareholder is given control. The explanation stems 
from the very specific nature of this kind of investor. Because he 
is both a debt holder and an equity holder, a mixed 
creditor/shareholder has less incentive to make decisions that
benefit one class of investors at the expense of another.
Furthermore, as the proportions of the firm's debt and equity
which the investor owns become closer, so his incentive structure 
becomes economically more efficient. And when the proportions are 
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